To come to validly know for oneself

[Ground]

Since the development of the template for valid knowledge in the thread 'Right knowledge' is scattered across a multitude of postings these shall be condensed into one or two postings here to make it easier to access.
After that there will be practical applications of this template for valid knowledge.
-------------------------
Rationale

"Of course you are uncertain, Kalamas. Of course you are in doubt. When there are reasons for doubt, uncertainty is born.
...
"So, as I said, Kalamas: 'Don't go by reports, by legends, by traditions, by scripture, by logical conjecture, by inference, by analogies, by agreement through pondering views, by probability, or by the thought, "This contemplative is our teacher." When you know for yourselves that, "These qualities are unskillful; these qualities are blameworthy; these qualities are criticized by the wise; these qualities, when adopted & carried out, lead to harm & to suffering" — then you should abandon them.' Thus was it said. And in reference to this was it said.

"Now, Kalamas, don't go by reports, by legends, by traditions, by scripture, by logical conjecture, by inference, by analogies, by agreement through pondering views, by probability, or by the thought, 'This contemplative is our teacher.' When you know for yourselves that, 'These qualities are skillful; these qualities are blameless; these qualities are praised by the wise; these qualities, when adopted & carried out, lead to welfare & to happiness' — then you should enter & remain in them.
...
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipit....065.than.html

The Kalama sutta is often taken as evidence by those who want to justify their private beliefs and pretend that their private beliefs are compliant with buddhism.

However at close inspection although the subject is right knowledge expressed as 'when you know for yourselves' the sutta actually is an appeal to belief.
Why?
Because there isn't any mention of how one may get rid of uncertainty and doubt by means of acquiring valid knowledge.
From where does knowledge arise about what is skillful and unskillful? Skillful with reference to what aim?
From where does knowledge arise about what is blameworthy and blameless? Who rightly blames and who does not rightly blame something?
And finally from where does knowledge arise about who is wise and who is unwise or ignorant?

The Kama sutta actually is an appeal to believe in social conventions and in authorities accepted by those conventions, to believe that those are wise, to believe that the one who speaks to the Kalamas is wise because they asked him in the first place, to believe in him and what he says because all other possible sources of valid knowledge are denied.

Luckily despite of such anti-rational sermons in early buddhism later buddhism has developed a tradition of logic and rational analysis. The most prominent figures in the context of buddhist logic are certainly the founders of this tradition: Dignaga and his follower Dharmakirti.

Due to its brevity the Nyayabindu of Dharmakirti - translated by Wayman in his A Millenium of Buddhist Logic - could be a perfect guideline for coming to validly know for oneself. However Dharmakirti's treatise is extremely terse and Wayman's translation of it is kept very close to the sanskrit original which makes it unsuitable to foster consistent understanding. Therefore only the first chapter of it shall be referred to here and when it comes to the second chapter which actually is decisive since it covers inference for oneself Dharmakirti's logic will be exlained using K. M. Rogers' elaborations on Pur-bu-jok Lam-pa-gya-tso's The Topic of Signs and Reasonings from the 'Great Path of Reasoning' in Tibetan Logic. The Gelug school of tibetan buddhism nowadays is the a living tradition that has established a curriculum based on Dharmakirti's logic and thus its explanations are suitable to foster consistent understanding of it.
End of Rationale
-------------------------
First to Dharmakirti's Chapter 1.

Chapter 1 is titled 'Direct perception' and the opening statement is of prime validity:

The success of all human aims is preceded by right cognition.

So valid knowledge is based on valid cognition and the successful pursuit of aims is based on valid knowledge. Every scientific professional should be able to agree to this.
-------------------------

Right cognition is twofold: direct perception and inference.

Among them, direct perception is free from constructive thought and is non-delusionary.

Constructive thought is the cognitive dawning of an image able to coalesce with verbalism.

Cognition free from such (constructive thought), when not subject to disturbances such as eye-caul, whirling motion, embarking in a boat, and agitation is direct perception.

So direct perception on the basis of healthy senses and free from external disturbing conditions is also free from constructive thought and is non-mistaken as to its object of engagement.

Some have wrongly concluded that direct perception is absolutely passive cognition. But if direct perception would be absolutely passive then there wouldn't appear any object since the senses would only receive totally unstructured raw sense data not yet associated to phenomena/objects.
So even if direct perception is defined as free from constructive thought there must already be included some intentional kind of intuitive clustering of raw sense data in what is called 'direct perception' here.

Also some have wrongly concluded that full-fledged conceptual thought based on constructive thought cannot be non-erroneous in contrast to direct perception but that would be contradictory since inference has been defined as one of the two kinds of valid cognitions and inference necessarily is full-fledged conceptual thought.

So the difference is just that with inference a general image as intervening appearing object is involved so that it does not get directly at the particular object whereas direct perception is defined here to not have this intervening image involved which however does not mean that there is absolutely no - at least intuitive - construct involved.

Empirically this confirms the conventional experience that what one has seen with one's own eyes, heard with one's own ears, smelled with one's own nose, tasted with one's own tongue, touched with one's own fingers appears to be more reliable than what one is merely told by someone else. This is why direct perception is called 'right' or 'valid' cognition and the whole of science relies on direct perception.

Nevertheless conceptual inference - if it complies with the rules of logical syllogisms expounded in this treatise - is said to be right or valid cognition too although it is indirect cognition.
This again is compliant with science since although science is primarily based on direct perception secondarily general rules are inferred from these direct perceptions. However before these rules are considered to be valid they must be finally confirmed by means of direct perceptions.
The latter is valid also in the context of this treatise on logic: if the subject, predicate and signs of logical syllogisms are not accessible to direct perception then the syllogisms cannot be reliable. It is important here to note that although abstract conceptual objects as such cannot be accessible to the senses their definitions nevertheless can be directly perceived. And if we have a sequence of abstract conceptual objects depending on each other at the end of a chain of definitions there always have to be particular objects directly accessible to the senses independent of definitions.



So even if both, direct perception and inference, are valid means of cognition, finally it is direct perception on which valid cognition is based generally.

In this way this kind of logic mirrors that which is known as scientific approach to valid knowledge today.
-------------------------
Next Dharmakirti lists the categories of his model of direct perception:

It is fourfold -
1. Sense-organ cognition.

2. Mental perception
(which) is engendered by the immediately preceding condition, to wit, the cooperating sense-organ cognition as an object that immediately follows its own (partite) sense-object.

Now this is important here in Dharmakirti's model! Sense direct perception is necessarily followed by a mental direct perception. That allows for assigning a more active role to the sequence "sense direct perception -> mental direct perception" since - as mentioned already above - a total passive reception of mere unstructured raw sense data would make it impossible to posit a directly perceived object/phenomenon. The locus for structuring and clustering raw sense data can now be assigned to mental direct perception as a kind of conditioned intuitive intentional perception which at least causes the structured appearance of nameless and meaningless objects/phenomena out of the chaos of the unstructured raw sense data of a nameless and meaningless sense impression which is the multipartite sense object of mental direct perception.

3. Introspection
(which) is of every thought and mental.

It is a wise move of Wayman to choose the word 'introspection' here since it may be widely accepted that there is something that is rightly called 'introspection'. Others choose the word 'apperception' which however is a word that in some circles causes painstaking but irrelevant epistemological debates.

and 4. yogin's cognition
(which is) born of the vivid fulfilment from contemplating the true end.

Dharmakirti's treatise wouldn't be a buddhist treatise if there wouldn't occur the last category of direct perception, i.e. a yogin's cognition which is the direct cognition of a meditator meditating on 'the ultimate'.

So whereas introspection is called 'mental' and therefore actually is a sub-category of mental direct perception a yogin's cognition isn't called 'mental' and remains dubious at that point.
-------------------------
Dharmakirti continues:

Its object is the individual character

I.e. the object of direct perception is the specifically characterized particular phenomenon.
Only directly perceptible phenomena can perform functions which is why rational purposive activity should focus exclusively on such phenomena. E.g. a directly perceptible bread can nourish my body. Bread exists because if it didn't I could not eat bread. And of course only directly perceptible bread performs the desired function. Merely thinking 'bread' does not perform the desired function of bread because the mere thought 'bread' is not a specifically characterized phenomenon but a generality of bread. The latter fact is referred to by the next quote:

Different from it is the generality character.
This is the object of inference.

So inference which is a thought entails a generality of which there are multiple specifically characterized phenomena as its instances. And since specifically characterized phenomena are particular directly perceptibles what is inferred can be verified by means of direct perception.
Success of purposive activity is possible only when the object of purposive activity can be directly perceived.

-------------------------
The next Chapter 2 is titled 'Inference for oneself' and starts with

Inference is twofold - for oneself and for others

Now considering the starting point, the Kalama sutta, only inference for oneself is relevant. Why? Because in the Kalama sutta it reads:

When you know for yourselves ...

So it is completely irrelevant what others believe to know. And this means that the 3rd Chapter titled 'Inference for others' meaning 'autonomous syllogisms for others' can be ignored.
If the Kalama sutta would teach how to come to validly know for oneself then it should read:

"Of course you are uncertain, Kalamas. Of course you are in doubt. When there are reasons for doubt, uncertainty is born.
...
"So, as I said, Kalamas: 'Only go by direct perception and rational reasoning based on direct perception. When you know for yourselves after having rationally analysed that, "These aims are not worthwhile to pursue - then you should abandon them.

"Now, Kalamas, 'Only go by direct perception and rational reasoning based on direct perception. When you know for yourselves after having rationally analysed that, "These aims are worthwhile to pursue - then you should rationally analyse by what rational means they can be attained and pursue them accordingly.

-------------------------
Now it is necessary to switch to K. M. Rogers' book to foster consistent understanding of syllogisms that are the verbal expression of inference.
There is the subject of a syllogism, the predicate as the property of the subject to be proven and the sign that proves the thesis.

Using variables, the thesis is:

{the subject} is {the predicate}
or
In {the subject} {the predicate} exists.

Using variables, the syllogism is:

{the subject} is {the predicate} because of {the sign}.
or
In {the subject} {the predicate} exists because of {the sign}.


In the following correct subjects and correct signs are explained
-------------------------
What are the conditions for a correct subject in a proof?

The subject of a proof must be a flawless subject.

What is a flawless subject?

A flawless subject is the basis of relation of the property of the subject, the sign. It is also the basis of inference because it is the basis in regard to which an inference is generated. And it is also the basis of investigation since knowledge of it is sought. And a flawless subject must be appropriate to the understanding of the one who wants to know the subject.


Something's being a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of {a subject} as {a predicate} by {a sign} is thus defined:
That observed as the common locus of 1. being held as the basis of investigation in the proof of {a subject} as {a predicate} by {a sign} and of 2. there existing a person who, having ascertained that it, {the subject}, is {the sign}, is engaged in wanting to know whether or not it is {the predicate}.


Thus the person who applies inference for itself fulfills the necessary condition for something being a flawless subject if - and only if - this person has already ascertained that {the subject} it holds as the basis for investigation is {the sign} and if - and only if - this persons wants to know whether or not {the subject} is {the predicate}. Otherwise {the sign} cannot become the valid reason for {the subject} being {the predicate}.
When the person doubts that {the subject} is {the sign} then {the subject} is not the flawless subject necessary in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate} by {the sign}.
And when the person has already ascertained that {the subject} is {the sign} but does not want to know (is indifferent) whether or not {the subject} is {the predicate} then {the subject} is also not the flawless subject necessary in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate} by {the sign}.
-------------------------