To come to validly know for oneself
Since the development of the template for valid knowledge in the thread 'Right knowledge' is scattered across a multitude of postings these shall be condensed into one or two postings here to make it easier to access.
After that there will be practical applications of this template for valid knowledge. ------------------------- Rationale Quote:
The Kalama sutta is often taken as evidence by those who want to justify their private beliefs and pretend that their private beliefs are compliant with buddhism. However at close inspection although the subject is right knowledge expressed as 'when you know for yourselves' the sutta actually is an appeal to belief. Why? Because there isn't any mention of how one may get rid of uncertainty and doubt by means of acquiring valid knowledge. From where does knowledge arise about what is skillful and unskillful? Skillful with reference to what aim? From where does knowledge arise about what is blameworthy and blameless? Who rightly blames and who does not rightly blame something? And finally from where does knowledge arise about who is wise and who is unwise or ignorant? The Kama sutta actually is an appeal to believe in social conventions and in authorities accepted by those conventions, to believe that those are wise, to believe that the one who speaks to the Kalamas is wise because they asked him in the first place, to believe in him and what he says because all other possible sources of valid knowledge are denied. Luckily despite of such anti-rational sermons in early buddhism later buddhism has developed a tradition of logic and rational analysis. The most prominent figures in the context of buddhist logic are certainly the founders of this tradition: Dignaga and his follower Dharmakirti. Due to its brevity the Nyayabindu of Dharmakirti - translated by Wayman in his A Millenium of Buddhist Logic - could be a perfect guideline for coming to validly know for oneself. However Dharmakirti's treatise is extremely terse and Wayman's translation of it is kept very close to the sanskrit original which makes it unsuitable to foster consistent understanding. Therefore only the first chapter of it shall be referred to here and when it comes to the second chapter which actually is decisive since it covers inference for oneself Dharmakirti's logic will be exlained using K. M. Rogers' elaborations on Pur-bu-jok Lam-pa-gya-tso's The Topic of Signs and Reasonings from the 'Great Path of Reasoning' in Tibetan Logic. The Gelug school of tibetan buddhism nowadays is the a living tradition that has established a curriculum based on Dharmakirti's logic and thus its explanations are suitable to foster consistent understanding of it. End of Rationale ------------------------- First to Dharmakirti's Chapter 1. Chapter 1 is titled 'Direct perception' and the opening statement is of prime validity: Quote:
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Some have wrongly concluded that direct perception is absolutely passive cognition. But if direct perception would be absolutely passive then there wouldn't appear any object since the senses would only receive totally unstructured raw sense data not yet associated to phenomena/objects. So even if direct perception is defined as free from constructive thought there must already be included some intentional kind of intuitive clustering of raw sense data in what is called 'direct perception' here. Also some have wrongly concluded that full-fledged conceptual thought based on constructive thought cannot be non-erroneous in contrast to direct perception but that would be contradictory since inference has been defined as one of the two kinds of valid cognitions and inference necessarily is full-fledged conceptual thought. So the difference is just that with inference a general image as intervening appearing object is involved so that it does not get directly at the particular object whereas direct perception is defined here to not have this intervening image involved which however does not mean that there is absolutely no - at least intuitive - construct involved. Empirically this confirms the conventional experience that what one has seen with one's own eyes, heard with one's own ears, smelled with one's own nose, tasted with one's own tongue, touched with one's own fingers appears to be more reliable than what one is merely told by someone else. This is why direct perception is called 'right' or 'valid' cognition and the whole of science relies on direct perception. Nevertheless conceptual inference - if it complies with the rules of logical syllogisms expounded in this treatise - is said to be right or valid cognition too although it is indirect cognition. This again is compliant with science since although science is primarily based on direct perception secondarily general rules are inferred from these direct perceptions. However before these rules are considered to be valid they must be finally confirmed by means of direct perceptions. The latter is valid also in the context of this treatise on logic: if the subject, predicate and signs of logical syllogisms are not accessible to direct perception then the syllogisms cannot be reliable. It is important here to note that although abstract conceptual objects as such cannot be accessible to the senses their definitions nevertheless can be directly perceived. And if we have a sequence of abstract conceptual objects depending on each other at the end of a chain of definitions there always have to be particular objects directly accessible to the senses independent of definitions. So even if both, direct perception and inference, are valid means of cognition, finally it is direct perception on which valid cognition is based generally. In this way this kind of logic mirrors that which is known as scientific approach to valid knowledge today. ------------------------- Next Dharmakirti lists the categories of his model of direct perception: Quote:
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So whereas introspection is called 'mental' and therefore actually is a sub-category of mental direct perception a yogin's cognition isn't called 'mental' and remains dubious at that point. ------------------------- Dharmakirti continues: Quote:
Only directly perceptible phenomena can perform functions which is why rational purposive activity should focus exclusively on such phenomena. E.g. a directly perceptible bread can nourish my body. Bread exists because if it didn't I could not eat bread. And of course only directly perceptible bread performs the desired function. Merely thinking 'bread' does not perform the desired function of bread because the mere thought 'bread' is not a specifically characterized phenomenon but a generality of bread. The latter fact is referred to by the next quote: Quote:
Success of purposive activity is possible only when the object of purposive activity can be directly perceived. ------------------------- The next Chapter 2 is titled 'Inference for oneself' and starts with Quote:
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If the Kalama sutta would teach how to come to validly know for oneself then it should read: Quote:
Now it is necessary to switch to K. M. Rogers' book to foster consistent understanding of syllogisms that are the verbal expression of inference. There is the subject of a syllogism, the predicate as the property of the subject to be proven and the sign that proves the thesis. Using variables, the thesis is: {the subject} is {the predicate} or In {the subject} {the predicate} exists. Using variables, the syllogism is: {the subject} is {the predicate} because of {the sign}. or In {the subject} {the predicate} exists because of {the sign}. In the following correct subjects and correct signs are explained ------------------------- What are the conditions for a correct subject in a proof? The subject of a proof must be a flawless subject. What is a flawless subject? A flawless subject is the basis of relation of the property of the subject, the sign. It is also the basis of inference because it is the basis in regard to which an inference is generated. And it is also the basis of investigation since knowledge of it is sought. And a flawless subject must be appropriate to the understanding of the one who wants to know the subject. Something's being a flawless subject sought to be known in the proof of {a subject} as {a predicate} by {a sign} is thus defined: That observed as the common locus of 1. being held as the basis of investigation in the proof of {a subject} as {a predicate} by {a sign} and of 2. there existing a person who, having ascertained that it, {the subject}, is {the sign}, is engaged in wanting to know whether or not it is {the predicate}. Thus the person who applies inference for itself fulfills the necessary condition for something being a flawless subject if - and only if - this person has already ascertained that {the subject} it holds as the basis for investigation is {the sign} and if - and only if - this persons wants to know whether or not {the subject} is {the predicate}. Otherwise {the sign} cannot become the valid reason for {the subject} being {the predicate}. When the person doubts that {the subject} is {the sign} then {the subject} is not the flawless subject necessary in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate} by {the sign}. And when the person has already ascertained that {the subject} is {the sign} but does not want to know (is indifferent) whether or not {the subject} is {the predicate} then {the subject} is also not the flawless subject necessary in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate} by {the sign}. ------------------------- |
After having specified the subject as flawless subject and clarified the conditions for something's being a flawless subject it is now necessary to specify the property of the subject, the correct sign, through clarifying the conditions for something's being the property of the subject, i.e. the sign's being established in relation to the subject, in the proof of {a subject} as {a predicate}.
For that purpose one can again refer to Roger's book and find Pur-bu-jok's definition of the conditions for something's being the property of the subject: Quote:
1. 'mode of statement' 2. 'only existing with {the subject}' 3. 'mutual difference with the {the subject}' 4. 'ascertained by valid cognition' ------------------------- 1. 'mode of statement' This expression refers to the two modes of statement of a syllogism: a) copular mode, i.e. 'is' statements using 'to be' b) ontological mode, i.e. 'exists' statements using 'to exist' In the ontological mode the subject in all cases is a locus or location and the predicate of this locus actually is something the existence of which in this locus is asserted by the thesis. ------------------------- Now that 'mode of statement' has been clarified it is possible to clarify ... 2. 'only existing with {the subject}' ... because it actually reads: 'only existing, in accordance with the mode of statement' First, 'only existing with {the subject}' is different in meaning from 'existing only with {the subject}'. The position of 'only' is decisive here. Second, in the copular mode the meaning of 'only existing with {the subject}' is 'each and every instance of {the subject} is {the sign} and {the sign} is with each and every instance of {the subject}'. This kind of mutual inclusion in case of the copular mode follows from the fact that the subject and the sign are of one entity. But they are not mutually inclusive in the sense that the sign can't be the property of different types of subjects too, because it can. This is because the sign is evidence for the predicate of the subject but there may be also different types of subjects that are the same predicate. [We can also apply the wording of the ontological mode (s. below) here through regarding the entity of the subject as 'the locus' and the sign as property existing 'in' this 'entity locus'.] Third, in the ontological mode the meaning of 'only existing with {the subject}' is 'each and every locus (= {the subject}) where {the sign} exists is a locus where {the predicate} exists too. Here the reverse is not applicable because {the sign} and {the predicate} are different entities and while {the sign's} existence is an effect of the {the predicate's} existence and when the effect exists its cause necessarily exists too, when a potential cause exists its potential effect does not necessarily exist too since a potential cause may always be obstructed. ------------------------- 3. 'mutual difference with the {the subject}' In the context of ontological mode it is quite obvious that the sign and the subject are mutually different since they have a cause-effect relationship and therefore are different entities. In the context of the copular mode however subject and sign are of one and the same entity. So what does 'mutual difference' mean? It simply means different in name and meaning. Even if the sign is the property of the subject and both are of one entity the name of the subject and the name of the sign are different and so are their meanings. With the requirement of mutual difference nonsensical syllogisms of the following kind are excluded: {the subject} is {the predicate} because of being {the subject} 4. 'ascertained by valid cognition' This requirement established the mutal dependency of being a flawless subject and being the property of the subject because in the definition of being a flawless subject acertainment of the subject being the sign is a condition and in the definition of being the property of the subject ascertainment of the sing as 'only existing, in accordance with the mode of statement, with {the subject}' is a condition. So the subject's being a flawless subject and the sign's being the property of the subject are the base of any valid syllogism together with the serious desire of wanting to know whether the subject is {the predicate} or not. Or - in the ontological mode: So the subject's being a flawless subject (i.e. locus) and the sign's existence in the locus are the base of any valid syllogism together with the serious desire of wanting to know whether the subject (i.e. locus) is a locus where {the predicate} exists or not. ------------------------- Now that the conditions for something's being property of the subject have been clarified which is one of the three essential conditions for a correct sign, the other two essential conditions, namely being the forward pervasion and being the counterpervasion, need to be elaborated on. Just as the property of the subject has the flawless subject as basis of relation, so the two, the forward pervasions and the counterpervasions also have a basis of relation, namely the similar class and the dissimilar class, resp. The similar class of the forward pervasions is the class of phenomena that share {the predicate} with the subject of the syllogism and the dissimilar class of the counterpervasions is the class of phenomena that do not share {the predicate} with the subject of the syllogism. Establishing the forward pervasion {the sign's} being the forward pervasion in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate} is defined as follows: {the sign} is the forward pervasion in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate} because: (1) There exists a correct similar example that possesses both {the sign} and {the predicate} of the probandum, in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate} by {the sign}; (2) {the sign} is related with {the predicate}; and (3) {the sign} is ascertained by valid cognition as existing, in accordance with the mode of statement, in only the similar class in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate}. The following expressions will now be clarified to clarify this definition: 1. There exists a correct similar example 2. {the sign} is related with {the predicate} 3. {the sign} is ascertained by valid cognition as existing, in accordance with the mode of statement, in only the similar class in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate}. 3.1 {the sign} must exist in the similar class, in accordance with the mode of statement; 3.2 ... must exist in only the similar class; 3.3 ... must exist in only the similar class, as opposed to only existing in the similar class (the position of “only” is important); 3.4 ... must be ascertained as existent in only the similar class. ------------------------- 1. There exists a correct similar example Copular mode: An example in a proof is a correct similar example, if {the example} is the basis with respect to which one ascertains the pervasion (that whatever is {the sign} is necessarily {the predicate}) - prior to ascertaining on the basis of this pervasion that {the subject} is {the predicate} because of being {the sign}. Ontological mode: An example in a proof is a correct similar example, if {the sign's} existence in {the example} locus is the basis with respect to which one ascertains the pervasion (that wherever {the sign's} existence is observed there necessarily {the predicate's} existence can be observed too) - prior to ascertaining on the basis of this pervasion that in the locus in question which is {the subject} {the predicate} exists because {the sign} exists [there]. 2. {the sign} is related with {the predicate} {the sign} is different from {the predicate} in name and meaning which is the prerequiste that {the sign} may be related with {the predicate}. 3. {the sign} is ascertained by valid cognition as existing, in accordance with the mode of statement, in only the similar class in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate}. 3.1 {the sign} must exist in the similar class, in accordance with the mode of statement; {the sign} must exist in the class of phenomena which are similar with respect to the {the predicate} to be proven. E.g. If {the predicate} to be proven is 'impermanent' then the name of the similar class is 'the impermanent'. If the mode of statement in the syllogism is copular then {the sign} must be {the predicate}. If the mode of statement in the syllogism is ontological then {the sign} must exist in 'the {the predicate}'. 3.2 ... must exist in only the similar class; If {the sign} is a correct sign then is must exist in only the similar class which means it must not exist also in the dissimilar class which is contradictory with the similar class. 3.3 ... must exist in only the similar class, as opposed to only existing in the similar class (the position of “only” is important); Here the position of 'only' is not before 'exist' but before 'the similar class' which means that not all members of the similar class are necessarily {the sign} but whatever is {the sign} is necessarily a member of only the similar class. 3.4 ... must be ascertained as existent in only the similar class. For a person who has doubt as to whether {the sign} exists only in the similar class or not {the sign} cannot be a correct sign since the forward pervasion is not established. ------------------------- Now that the conditions for something's being the forward pervasion have been clarified the conditions for something's being the counterpervasions need to be elaborated on. The procedure parallels the elaboration on the forward pervasion approximately but not exactly. The dissimilar class of the counterpervasion is the class of phenomena that not only does not share {the predicate} with the subject of the syllogism but the dissimilar class is contradictory with the similar class with respect to {the predicate}. Establishing the counterpervasion {the sign's} being the counterpervasion in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate} is defined as follows: {the sign} is the counterpervasion in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate} because: (1) There exists a correct dissimilar example which possesses neither {the sign} nor {the predicate} of the probandum, in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate} by {the sign}; (2) {the sign} is related with {the predicate}; and (3) {the sign} is ascertained by valid cognition as only nonexistent in the dissimilar class in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate}. The following expressions will now be clarified to clarify this definition: 1. There exists a correct dissimilar example 2. {the sign} is related with {the predicate} 3. {the sign} is ascertained by valid cognition as only nonexistent in the dissimilar class in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate}. 3.1 {the sign} must be nonexistent in the dissimilar class; 3.2 ... must be only nonexistent in the dissimilar class; 3.3 ... must be only nonexistent in the dissimilar class, as opposed to being nonexistent in only the dissimilar class (the position of “only” is important); 3.4 ... must be ascertained as only nonexistent in the dissimilar class. ------------------------- 1. There exists a correct dissimilar example Copular mode: An example in a proof is a correct dissimilar example, if {the example} is the basis with respect to which one ascertains the counterpervasion (that whatever is not {the predicate} is necessarily not {the sign}) - prior to ascertaining on the basis of this counterpervasion that {the subject} is {the predicate} because of being {the sign}. Ontological mode: An example in a proof is a correct dissimilar example, if {the predicate's} nonexistence in {the example} locus is the basis with respect to which one ascertains the counterpervasion (that wherever {the predicate's} existence cannot be observed there necessarily {the sign} does not exist) - prior to ascertaining on the basis of this counterpervasion that in the locus in question which is {the subject} {the predicate} exists because {the sign} exists [there]. 2. {the sign} is related with {the predicate} {the sign} is different from {the predicate} in name and meaning which is the prerequiste that {the sign} may be related with {the predicate}. 3. {the sign} is ascertained by valid cognition as only nonexistent in the dissimilar class in the proof of {the subject} as {the predicate}. 3.1 {the sign} must be nonexistent in the dissimilar class; {the sign} must not exist in the dissimilar class of phenomena which are dissimilar with respect to the {the predicate} to be proven. E.g. If {the predicate} to be proven is 'impermanent' then the name of the dissimilar class is 'the permanent'. 3.2 ... must be only nonexistent in the dissimilar class; If {the sign} is a correct sign then is must be only nonexistent in the dissimilar class which means that none of the members of the dissimilar class of phenomena is {the sign} (copular) or in none of the members of the dissimilar class of locuses where {the predicate} cannot be observed does {the sign} exist (ontological). 3.3 ... must be only nonexistent in the dissimilar class, as opposed to being nonexistent in only the dissimilar class (the position of “only” is important); Here the position of 'only' is not before 'the dissimilar class' but before 'nonexistent' which means - in copular mode - that all members of the dissimilar class are necessarily not {the sign} but that does not exclude that also some members of the similar class may be not {the sign}. 3.4 ... must be ascertained as only nonexistent in the dissimilar class. For a person who has doubt as to whether {the sign} is only nonexistent in the dissimilar class or not {the sign} cannot be a correct sign since the counterpervasion is not established. ------------------------- To summarize: There are 3 essential valid ascertainments that are inevitable conditions for a syllogism's functioning as valid proof for an investigator: 1. The investigator has to ascertain that {the sign} is the property of {the subject}. The relationship to be established is one between {the subject} and {the sign}. The basis of relation is {the subject}. 2. The investigator has to ascertain that {the sign} is the forward pervasion. The relationship to be established is one between {the sign} and {the predicate}. The basis of relation is {the sign}. 3. The investigator has to ascertain that {the sign} is the counterpervasion. The relationship to be established is one between {the sign} and the opposite of {the predicate}. The basis of relation is {the sign}. After establishing a strictly defined logical relationship between {the sign} and {the predicate} (-> items 2 and 3) - which means that if {the predicate} is eliminated {the sign} necessarily is eliminated, too - the mind must focus on the {the subject's} being {the sign} (item 1) to realize the thesis of the syllogism, i.e. that {the subject} is {the predicate}. It is obvious that coming to validly know for oneself that the thesis of a syllogism is right cannot be achieved through casual reasoning but needs a certain level of concentration which is dynamic since the mind's focus is changing. ------------------------- Now to conclude this brief abstract about coming to validly know for oneself by means of buddhist logic there still remains the topic of categories of correct signs. There are three 3 main categories of correct sigs: 1. Effect signs 2. Nature signs 3. Nonobservation signs As to 1: A correct effect sign is the three modes and the predicate of the syllogism is the sign's cause. So the sign is the effect which proves its cause. That means that predicate and sign are different entities. Please note that the reverse is not valid: it is not possible to prove an effect by its cause as sign. Why? Because a potential cause always may be obstructed. As to 2: A correct nature sign is the three modes and the subject of the syllogism is both, the predicate and the sign. That means that predicate and sign are of one entity, i.e. two different properties of the subject. As to 3: A correct nonobservation sign is the three modes and the thesis of the syllogism is based on a negation of a predicate, e.g. 'is not {the predicate}' or '{the predicate} does not exist in ...' or '{the subject} is empty of {the predicate}' and the like. There may be a several relationships between the nonobservation signs and the negative predicate: 3.1 Nonobservation of a Cause Where a specific cause cannot be observed its effect must be absent too. 3.2. Nonobservation of a Pervader Where a certain type of phenomena that contains the predicate cannot be observed the predicate must be absent too. E.g. where there are not trees, there are no oaks. 3.3 Nonobservation of a Nature Where there is no valid perception of an object that object is absent. This is because perception of an object and existence of that object are equivalent in nature. 3.4 Correct Signs That Are an Observation of an Object That Is Contradictory in the Sense of Not Abiding Together E.g. cold and fire do not abide together. 3.5 Correct Signs That Are an Observation of an Object That Is Contradictory in the Sense of Mutual Exclusion I.e. although the objects may abide together they are mutually exclusive. E.g. although a car and a tree may abide together that which displays the characteristics of a car is not a tree. ------------------------- If you are interested in more details about the topic please be referred to the literature mentioned in the beginning. |
The Sutra in a nutshell is saying.
Get a teacher and experience the truth of my teaching. The people he is talking to then go on to say okay we see your point and will work with your monks to experience that which you say is true. It's all about the importance of having a teacher and doing the practices :) When you do the practices you will experience a change within and know the teachings to be true. |
Here is a dharma talk by Thich Nhat Hanh on Direct Perception.
https://tnhaudio.org/2014/01/28/perception-reality/ The audio: https://f001.backblazeb2.com/file/tn...2014-01-19.mp3 |
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That makes so much more sense. Thanks for sharing this. |
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The issue of how to validly know whether a person is ignorant or wise still remains. Quote:
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"The Dhamma" are the authentic buddhist texts and the investigation is nothing but rational analysis. Therefore beware of so called 'teachers'. On order to come to validly know for yourself you take authentic buddhist texts and apply rationality. How to apply rationality? The template of buddhist logic has been provided above. |
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I don't confuse Buddhism and Hinduism at all. You are taking quotes out of context. The last paragraph of the Kalama Sutta. Notice they go to the monks and learn and practice. Quote:
Your next quote: Quote:
You left out what type of teacher the Buddha recommends and the super powers he has because of such realization. Quote:
Your next quote: Quote:
Did you not read the rest of the paragraph? Quote:
The Dhamma and you are one and the same. It is a method, it is not saying go it alone. He is saying use your body to observe. He is talking to a monk, one of his monks as a hint. Your next quote goes into much more detail.. which you leave out... of course. Quote:
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This is a very powerful technique. A step by step method that i like is called Insight Dialogue. https://metta.org/insight-dialogue-3/ I think you are trying to find sentences that meet your views instead of really researching and finding out the Buddhist view. |
Direct perception is much deeper than what you are writing.
First it is important to know what reality is in Buddhism. Quote:
While the above talks about direct perception the quote below goes in to much greater detail. Quote:
Direct perception is a realization. Not some logical tool where one is to intellectualize the truth. |
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Wow you just hit my DP (direct perception) spot and it smiled in recognition. |
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If you are advocating blind faith then you are actually off topic in this thread. Why? Because the topic is how to come to validly know for oneself and a generally valid template for coming to validly know for oneself has been provided. So there is nothing more to discuss. Either you apply the template or you don't. Quote:
How does one validly know such 'super powers' of another? One cannot validly know such things at all. Why? Because one cannot know qualities that are not directly perceptible. Again you are advocating mere belief. you are off topic! Quote:
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you however rely on belief that is not valid knowledge. Quote:
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